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Abstract 
The question of whether cognition can influence perception has a long history in 
neuroscience and philosophy. Here, we outline a novel approach to this issue, 
arguing that it should be viewed within the framework of top-down information-
processing. This approach leads to a reversal of the standard explanatory order 
of the cognitive penetration debate: we suggest studying top-down processing at 
various levels without preconceptions of perception or cognition. Once a clear 
picture has emerged about which processes have influences on those at lower 
levels, we can re-address the extent to which they should be considered 
perceptual or cognitive. Using top-down processing within the visual system as a 
model for higher-level influences, we argue that the current evidence indicates 
clear constraints on top-down influences at all stages of information processing; 
it does, however, not support the notion of a boundary between specific types of 
information-processing as proposed by the cognitive impenetrability hypothesis. 
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One influential debate about perception concerns its purity: is perception an 
encapsulated process that is protected from influences by cognition or is 
perceptual bottom-up processing influenced by top-down cognitive information? 
This debate, which is frequently referred to as the Ǯcognitive penetration debateǯ, 
is complicated by the fact that it is often not clear what kind of mental state is 
supposed to be doing the penetrating and what kind of mental state is supposed 
to be penetrated. )n other words, it is not clear what is Ǯtopǯ and what is Ǯbottomǯ 
in the debate about top-down influences on perception.  
 
In the first part of this paper, we attempt to clarify some of these conceptual 
issues. We then proceed to suggest a practical alternative to the philosophical 
turf wars concerning the extent to which perception is encapsulated. We start 
with two uncontroversial observations: First, even the most avid proponents of 
the view that perception is cognitively impenetrable accept the existence of top-
down processing within the visual system;1 in other words, it is uncontroversial 
that higher-levels of visual processing feed back information to and shape lower-
levels of visual processing (Pylyshyn, 1999). And second, the exact locus of the 
boundary between perception and cognition is notoriously difficult to determine 
(Masrour 2011, Siewert 2002, Siegel 2007, Kriegel 2007 and Bayne 2009, Nanay 
2011, 2012, 2013). On the basis of these two observations, we argue that 
important insights might be gained once we stop focusing exclusively on top-
down modulation of perception by cognition; rather, we suggest that it is 
heuristically valuable to view this special case within the broader context of top-
down influences in a hierarchically organised information processing system.  
 
The general agreement concerning top-down processing within the visual 
system can be used as a starting point from which our understanding can be 
expanded to potential higher-level top-down influences without having to 
commit a priori to what exactly counts as perception or cognition. Once such an 
approach has been adopted, we can start asking nuanced questions about the 
specific mechanism of top-down modulation in information processing in 
general. Among other questions, we can ask what kinds of constraints exist on 
top-down influences between certain levels of processing and whether some of 
these constraints might amount to a full-blown boundary as proposed by the 
encapsulation hypothesis. According to our evaluation of the theoretical and 
empirical evidence, there is no reason to assume that top-down processing is 
restricted to specific parts of the information processing hierarchy. By contrast, 
we defend a view that puts clear constraints on all sorts of top-down processing – as well as on bottom-up processing – but that allows bidirectional flow of 
information between levels that some would consider to cross the perception-
cognition divide. 
 
I. Two debates about top-down influences on perception 
 
The main conceptual confusion concerning debates about top-down influences on perception is that it is not clear what is meant by Ǯperceptionǯ in this context. 
Many philosophers (Siegel 2011, Macpherson 2012, Stokes 2012), but also some 
                                                 
1
 We will focus on the visual sense modality in this paper, but there is no prima facie reason why our 
conclusions could not be generalized to other sense modalities.  
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psychologists (e.g., Firestone and Scholl 2016), take Ǯperceptionǯ to be perceptual 
experience: something we are consciously aware of. According to this 
conceptualisation, the question is whether top-down influences can alter the way 
we experience a scene – the phenomenal character of our experience: what it is 
like to perceive this scene.  
 
Another way of understanding what is meant by Ǯperceptionǯ when we talk about 
top-down influences is perceptual processing – something neuroscientists, 
psychophysicists, and some psychologists worry about. Here, the question is 
whether a certain type of information processing is influenced in a top-down 
manner. Most generally, all computations that are specialised for and concerned 
with transforming the spatio-temporal pattern of light hitting the retina into 
meaningful representations can be considered part of visual processing. 
Following the work of David Marr (1982), visual processing is often specified in 
further detail in terms of computations that lead to specific geometrical 
descriptions of a visual scene (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1999). Our understanding of the 
neurobiological architecture of the early parts of the visual system is advanced 
enough to provide a general picture of how such a functional description of 
vision is realised by populations of neurons that extract information about 
specific perceptual properties such as orientation, contours, motion, etc. in 
striate and extrastriate cortices. Evidence of top-down modulation in these brain 
areas would therefore count as evidence for top-down modulation of perceptual 
processing. 
 
These two questions are clearly very different – one of them is about 
phenomenology and the other is about a specific type of information processing. 
We are extremely pessimistic about whether the first of these debates could ever 
be resolved in a satisfactory manner. The main reason for this pessimism is 
methodological in nature. Most studies that attempt to address the extent to 
which perceptual phenomenology is influenced by top-down processing rely, at 
least to some degree, on introspection, which is known to be notoriously 
unreliable (see Nisbett and Wilson 1977, Kahneman and Tversky 1973, Tversky 
and Kahneman 1981, Zhong and Liljenquist 2006, Williams and Bargh 2008, 
Wegner 2002, Haggard et al. 2002, Wegner et al. 2004, Greenwald and Banaji 
1995, Dunham et al. 2008 and Schwitzgebel 2008, Spener and Bayne 2010 – this 
is merely the tip of the iceberg of the vast literature on the unreliability of 
introspection). But we do not mean to suggest that it is only by introspection that 
one can find out about perceptual phenomenology. The so-called Ǯmethodology of contrast casesǯ (Siegel 2006, Kriegel 2007), for example, combines 
introspective evidence with an inference to the best explanation – it is not 
introspection alone that does the job (although introspection is a necessary 
ingredient of all attempts to characterize perceptual phenomenology). What we 
take to be an even more important worry about the focus on perceptual 
phenomenology is that it is difficult to settle disagreements about the nature of 
perceptual phenomenology.  
 
The main difficulty in this debate is to determine what is part of our perceptual 
as opposed to non-perceptual phenomenology. Those who argue for the 
existence of top-down influences on perceptual phenomenology need to show 
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that there can be two mental states, call them M1 and M2, that only differ in that 
there is a top-down influence in M2, which is missing in M1 and that the two 
differ in their perceptual phenomenology. So the top-down influence results in a 
difference in perceptual phenomenology. Those who are against the idea of top-
down influences on perceptual phenomenology can acknowledge that M1 and 
M2 differ only in that top-down influences are present in M2 but absent in M1 
and they can also acknowledge that M1 and M2 differ in their non-perceptual 
phenomenology – they only deny that they differ in their perceptual 
phenomenology. So the only way of adjudicating between the proponents and 
the opponents of top-down influences on perceptual experience is by having a 
very clear distinction between perceptual and non-perceptual phenomenology.  
 
But we are blatantly missing any such clear distinction or even a methodology 
that might be able to help develop it. Take the following example: You are at a 
dinner party and are eating what you take to be chicken. Then your host tells you 
that it is in fact rat meat. Your experience, presumably, changes. The meat tastes 
differently. This seems to be an indication that your perceptual phenomenology 
changes – what changes is the way the meat tastes to you. But suppose that you 
insist that what changed was not the perceptual but the non-perceptual 
phenomenology in this example. It is difficult to see what could possibly settle 
this disagreement. We may be able to tell whether our overall phenomenology 
changed. But to tell whether this phenomenal change was perceptual or non-
perceptual is much more difficult. In other words, if I say that M1 and M2 differ 
in their perceptual phenomenology and you deny this, it is not clear how the 
issue can be decided or what methodology might provide further insight. 
Intuitions wildly differ with regards to what phenomenal character counts as 
perceptual.  
 
The debate about whether there are top-down influences on perceptual 
experiences inherits the problems that arise from the lack of a methodology to 
tell perceptual and non-perceptual phenomenology apart. However, once we 
accept a conceptualisation of perception in terms of perceptual processing, the 
situation substantially improves. Here, we can draw on a rich methodological 
toolbox that includes psychophysical techniques, electrophysiology, 
neuroimaging, and computational neuroscience. While each of these 
methodologies comes with its own limitations and difficulties, they generally 
provide sophisticated ways of shedding light on perceptual processing at 
different levels of description from single neurons to full perceptual 
representations.  
 
As a supplementary point, we would like to briefly highlight one specific 
discussion within psychophysics, which has not been explored in much detail by 
philosophers but, we believe, could have interesting implications for the relationship between the two debates highlighted above ȋǮperception as phenomenologyǯ vs. Ǯperception as processingǯȌ. While psychophysicists are 
interested in perceptual processing, there is a certain distinction within 
psychophysics that, somewhat indirectly, alludes to phenomenology: the 
distinction between performance-based and appearance-based tasks (Kingdom 
& Prins, 2009), which is closely related to the distinction between Class A and 
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Class B observations (Brindley, 1960; Morgan, Melmoth, & Solomon, 2013). 
Without going into any of the technical details, roughly, performance-based tasks 
attempt to measure how good an observer is at a specific task, they measure the 
limits of sensitivity of perceptual processing. These aspects of perception can be 
characterised without any reference to phenomenology in human observers, and 
any biological or artificial measurement system. A typical example would be the characterisation of an observerǯs absolute contrast detection threshold, i.e., the 
lowest contrast an observer is able to detect at a certain performance level.  
 
Appearance-based tasks on the other hand attempt to measure certain biases in 
perceptual processing. For instance, in the Müller-Lyer illusion the orientation of 
the fins with respect to the central line induce a certain bias in size processing 
and change how observers judge the length of the central line. It would not make 
sense to ask how sensitive the observer is to differences in length in this 
instance; rather, appearance-based tasks measure changes in the apparent 
magnitude of a certain stimulus dimension. While psychophysicists typically 
avoid specifying what exactly they mean by appearance or apparent magnitude 
of stimulus dimension, these tasks seem to focus on something similar to what 
philosophers have in mind when talking about perceptual phenomenology. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that psychophysical work that relies on 
appearance-based tasks has been haunted by problems that share some 
similarity to the ones mentioned above in the context of perceptual 
phenomenology. In particular, it is difficult to ensure that measured biases are 
perceptual in nature (Jogan & Stocker, 2014; Morgan et al., 2013; Morgan, 
Dillenburger, Raphael, & Solomon, 2012; Storrs, 2015).  
 
In psychophysics, this problem is indirectly addressed by attempts to exclude the 
possibility for non-perceptual factors such as response biases and decision 
biases to affect results. In particular, in recent years, researchers have developed 
sophisticated methodologies to precisely control for the contamination of 
findings by such non-perceptual biases (Jogan & Stocker, 2014; Morgan et al., 
2013). To our knowledge, these methods have so far not been applied to the 
study of top-down influences on perception; yet, given that many supposed top-
down effects in perception that philosophers have been interested in can 
essentially be re-conceptualised as biases, we believe that these novel tasks will 
be of huge significance for new insights in this domain. More generally, we 
believe that closer analyses of the distinction between performance- and 
appearance-based tasks or Class A/B observations in psychophysics might hold 
some insights for philosophers interested in perception as phenomenology in the 
context of top-down effects.  
 
To summarise this section, we believe that some of the conceptual confusion 
concerning top-down influences on visual perception arise from at least two 
distinct notions of what perception is considered to be in this context: perceptual 
phenomenology or perceptual information processing. Given the fundamental 
problems in distinguishing perceptual from non-perceptual phenomenology, we 
argue that the real debate about top-down influences on perception is about 
whether perceptual processing is influenced in a top-down manner. This is what 
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we take to be the question of Ǯtop-down influences on perceptionǯ in what 
follows.2  
 
 
II. Cognitive penetration and top-down processing 
 
We view the question of cognitive penetration as part of the wider research 
endeavour that attempts to understand top-down influences on perception. We 
believe that this perspective has various advantages over an exclusive focus on 
cognitive influences on perceptual processing. The most important benefit of 
such an approach is that it provides us with a framework that allows us to ask 
more nuanced questions: the question of top-down influences on perception is 
no longer a simple yes-no question as in the case of cognitive penetration, but a 
multifaceted one. For instance, we can ask specific questions about which types 
of computations at which level of processing have effects on mechanisms further 
down the hierarchy. We can ask whether and what kinds of constraints are 
exerted onto top-down influences at different levels of processing. We can ask 
functional questions of why such constraints might or might not exist.  
 
Moreover, when we start addressing these questions, we can build on a solid 
body of literature concerned with top-down effects: those within the visual 
system. We will provide a few examples of such effects in the next section. For 
the purpose of this section, it suffices to say that the existence of top-down 
influences from higher onto lower levels of processing within the visual system is 
accepted even by researchers, who strongly oppose the idea that vision can be 
influenced by cognition (Pylyshyn, 1999). These findings provide a natural 
starting point for the attempt to push the boundary of top-down effects up the 
hierarchy.  
 
One benefit that follows from viewing cognitive penetration in the wider context 
of top-down influences on perception is that we can reverse the standard 
explanatory order of the cognitive penetration debate. The original way of 
raising the question of cognitive penetration was this: First, we need  
independent ways of identifying cognitive processing and perceptual processing. 
Second, we can ask about the influences between the two (namely, whether the 
former influences the latter). But we have seen that these independent ways of 
characterising perception and cognition are often based on unsatisfactory 
methodology. There are major differences in what different researchers consider 
to be perception or cognition, and some authors question the validity of the 
perception/cognition distinction altogether. In fact, within the cognitive 
penetration debate, it has been repeatedly suggested in the past couple of years 
that the abundance of top-down influences in perceptual and non-perceptual 
processing forces us to take perception to be continuous with cognition in the 
                                                 
2
 It is important to highlight that recent work by Firestone and Scholl (forthcoming) against top-down 
influences on perception concern very explicitly the debate about whether there are top-down 
influences on perceptual phenomenology. So their attack on top-down influences are strictly speaking 
irrelevant for our argument and they (as well as the methodological controversies noted in the 
commentaries to this article) provide an additional reason to shift the debate from perceptual 
phenomenology to perceptual processing.  
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sense that there is no real boundary between them (Clark, 2013; Fletcher & 
Frith, 2009, Lupyan 2010, 2015, Vetter and Newen 2014, Hohwy 2013). 
 
It is important to point out that this somewhat radical conclusion does not follow 
from our proposal here. What we propose is a reverse order of explanation: 
without assuming anything about what is perception and what is cognition, we 
can identify top-down influences at a wide variety of points of information 
processing, from very low levels to very high levels (for an overview of some 
relevant studies see the following sections). And once we have a clearer picture 
of what types of computational mechanisms have influences on those at lower 
levels, we can re-address the question of the extent to which they should be 
considered perceptual or cognitive. If it turns out that there is a continuous 
cascade of top-down flow of information – and, in our reading, the current state 
of research seems to suggest exactly that – then no matter how we define 
perception and cognition (and regardless of where we draw the 
perception/cognition boundary), we have good reason to conclude that 
perception is subject to top-down cognitive influences. Note, however, that 
nothing in this proposal forces us to deny that there is a point in neural 
processing where strictly perceptual processing ends and cognitive processing 
begins.  
 
No-one thinks that the fact that perception influences cognition implies that 
there is no difference between the two. Similarly, we can hold on to a distinction 
between perception and cognition even if there are influences from the latter 
onto the former. In other words, the question of whether there is a boundary 
between perception and cognition is orthogonal to the question of what kind of 
uni- or bidirectional influences exist between the two. To sum up, our way of 
conceptualising cognitive penetration as part of a continuous cascade of top-
down processes that stretches from very high-level processing to very low-level 
processing is consistent with denying that there is any meaningful perception vs. 
cognition boundary. But it is also consistent with the existence of such a 
boundary.  
 
 
III. Top-down processing within the visual system 
 
In the past decades, our understanding of the structural and functional 
organisation of visual systems in various mammalian species has improved 
dramatically and, in nonhuman and human primates, an increasing number of 
cortical areas dedicated to processing visual inputs has been and still is being 
characterised (for reviews see (Bullier, 2004; Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; Grill-
Spector & Malach, 2004; Katzner & Weigelt, 2013; Van Essen, 2004; Van Essen & 
Maunsell, 1983). In humans and nonhuman primates, the main visual pathway 
connects neural networks in the retina to the primary visual cortex (V1) via the 
lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) in the thalamus; outputs from V1 are fed 
forward to a range of extrastriate areas. Thalamocortical and corticocortical 
connectivity in the visual system can be categorised anatomically as feedforward 
or feedback (Bullier, 2004). On the basis of this distinction, the different visual 
areas have been arranged in a structural hierarchy with partly parallel streams 
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{Felleman:1991km, VanEssen:1983ea, VanEssen:2004vf}. This structural 
organisation of the visual system shows consistent similarities with functional 
hierarchies of information processing (Bond, 2004): neurons in early cortical 
areas are particularly sensitive to basic stimulus properties such as local edge 
information in the incoming light array and provide the inputs to later areas, 
which are tuned to increasingly complex stimulus properties. While the general 
notion of a hierarchical organisation of the visual system has been useful and 
influential, some degree of caution is warranted given the amount of 
disagreement about the exact hierarchical level of certain cortical areas (Bullier, 
2004; Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004; Hilgetag, O'Neill, & Young, 1996). At present, 
it seems fair to say that beyond cortical areas V1, V2, and V3 an assignment of a 
given area to a specific structural or functional level is associated with some 
uncertainty. 
 
An early and influential attempt to characterise vision computationally can be 
found in David Marrǯs seminal work (Marr, 1982). He proposed several levels of 
computation based on a cascade of filtering stages, starting with the retinal 
image and progressively building up 3D representations of a visual scene. The 
computational levels of this model, and of those following in its footsteps, are 
again hierarchically organised, mirroring the organisation of the bottom-up 
pathway of the primate visual system. A common confusion in current 
discussions on top-down processing arises from the assumption that prior information or Ǯknowledgeǯ that is independent from retinal input can influence 
visual processing only via top-down modulation. It is typical, that despite being 
conceptualised as purely bottom-up, computations in models such as Marrǯs 
heavily rely on information other than that contained in the retinal image. Inputs 
that emanate from the environment are structured and exhibit certain 
regularities (Brunswik & Kamiya, 1953; Geisler, 2007; Simoncelli & Olshausen, 
2001). Many organisms exploit this fact by finely tuning their sensory and 
perceptual systems to the structure of the environmental properties that are 
relevant to their survival and reproduction. To name just two examples, linear 
and non-linear receptive field properties of neurons in the early visual system of 
primates are structured in such a way as to most efficiently code natural 
environments (Bell & Sejnowski, 1997; Olshausen & Field, 1996; Rao & Ballard, 
1999; Schwartz & Simoncelli, 2001) and contour integration processes in 
humans mirror the contour structures of objects in natural scenes (Geisler & 
Perry, 2009). These examples illustrate that the structure of biological vision systems reflects relevant properties of an organismǯs surround. In other words, prior information about the statistical regularities in an organismǯs environment 
is embodied in the way in which the visual system processes incoming signals. 
This kind of restriction on the way in which information can be processed is 
often referred to as natural constraints. It is widely acknowledged that human 
vision would be impossible without incorporating prior information in the form 
of natural constraints because the retinal image drastically underspecifies the 
relevant aspects of our three-dimensional environment – a phenomenon often referred to as the Ǯpoverty of the stimulusǯ.  
 
Interestingly, while David Marr is often portrayed as the redeemer of pure 
bottom-up models, he did not deny the existence of top-down processes (Marr, 
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1976; 1982). Rather, in his model-building, he used the restriction to bottom-up 
processes as a heuristic tool to explore how far biological and machine vision 
could get without top-down processing and, indeed, he thought that such 
processes are of minor importance in early vision. Today, many vision 
researchers take the opposite perspective and acknowledge that full recovery of 
a visual scene under natural conditions is most likely impossible without top-
down processing due to difficulties in correct segmentation of objects in the face 
of occlusion, shadows, motion, reflections, luminance edges and gradients due to 
lighting, etc. (e.g., (Bullier, 2001; Cavanagh, 2011; Gilbert & Sigman, 2007; 
Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Roelfsema, 2006; Sillito, 
Cudeiro, & Jones, 2006). One of the main limitations of pure bottom-up 
processing is that it cannot combine information from the detailed local analysis 
of areas such as V1 and V2 with the more global integration of information 
carried out in higher-level areas such as MT or V4. Neurons in V1 and V2 have 
small receptive fields; furthermore, lateral connectivity within V1 and V2 is 
spatially limited and, due to its slow temporal properties, even a cascade of 
lateral connections could not mediate integration of inputs over larger areas 
(Angelucci & Bressloff, 2006). These cortical areas therefore provide a very 
precise representation of local visual properties but are unable to integrate 
information across long distances in the visual field. Neurons in higher-level 
areas have larger receptive fields and can do exactly that but lose the fine-
grained precision of V1 and V2 neurons. While a consensus on how exactly top-
down modulation via feedback connections is linked to bottom-up processing 
has not yet been reached, it is generally thought to achieve an integration of local 
and global levels of analysis (Bullier, 2001; 2004; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; 
Sillito et al., 2006).  
 
Top-down processing even at the earliest levels of the visual system has been 
described in some detail in primates using simultaneous recordings of single- 
and multi-units at different sites (for reviews see (Bullier, 2001; 2004; Hupe et 
al., 1998; Sillito et al., 2006). From this work a detailed picture emerges 
suggesting an important role of top-down influences from V1 onto LGN neurons 
as well as from MT onto V1 for the perception and segregation of moving objects. 
In particular, local V1 circuitry is modulated by MT in a stimulus-specific manner 
so that processing of features represented at the more global analysis are 
optimised; V1 activity in turn has similar effects on LGN responses. Hence, V1 
and MT shape the response properties of cells providing their own inputs. 
Modulation of LGN and V1 responses by MT are made possible by the fast 
transmission of information through the magnocellular pathway to MT, allowing 
feedback to influence how signals relayed through more slowly conducting 
parvo- and koniocellular-dominated pathways are processed at lower levels 
(Bullier, 2001; Sillito et al., 2006). Studies on human observers support the 
notion that top-down influences from the human motion complex MT+/V5 onto 
V1 are critical for the perception of objects in motion (Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 
2001; Silvanto, Cowey, Lavie, & Walsh, 2005; Sterzer, Haynes, & Rees, 2006). 
 
Many further examples of top-down processing via feedback connections come 
from studies on various aspects of perceptual organization such as figure-ground 
segregation (e.g. (Lamme, 1995; Self, van Kerkoerle, Supèr, & Roelfsema, 2013), 
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contour integration (e.g. {Shpaner:2013hy, Altmann:2003wh}, and shape 
perception (e.g. {Drewes:2016ky, Murray:2004dw}. These studies have been 
conducted in both animals and humans, and have employed different 
psychophysical and neurobiological techniques. Additional support comes from 
work on illusory contour perception (Murray & Herrmann, 2013; Nieder, 2002; 
Seghier & Vuilleumier, 2006). Certain stimulus configurations induce the 
perception of a contour that has no physical match in the environment, a so-
called illusory contour. Electrophysiological studies that recorded 
simultaneously at different sites in the primate brain provide evidence 
suggesting that illusory contours emerge through top-down influences from V2 
(and possibly higher cortical areas) onto V1 (Lee & Nguyen, 2001). The 
functional interpretation of these findings again highlight the importance of 
integrating information from the fine-grained measurements in V1 with a more 
global analysis conducted in V2 and higher cortical areas. Studies on human 
observers using a range of different neurobiological techniques largely support 
this finding (Murray & Herrmann, 2013; Seghier & Vuilleumier, 2006). The most 
direct demonstration in humans comes from a study by Wokke and colleageus 
(2012) who used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to disrupt perceptual 
processing in early (V1/V2) and late (LOC) parts of the visual system at different 
time delays from stimulus onset. Results indicate that all brain areas are 
involved in processing illusory contours but the critical timing for disruption in 
the different areas suggests that feedback from LOC onto V1 and V2 plays a 
critical role.  
 
This is only the tip of the iceberg of the large body of evidence for top-down 
processing within the visual system. The examples that we have summarised in 
this section are only meant as an illustration of this body of literature and to 
show that top-down influences via feedback connections within the visual 
system are an important part of visual information processing. The function of 
top-down processing is to allow an integration of local and global levels of 
analysis, which leads to an optimisation of response properties of the overall 
system to deal with currently incoming inputs.  
 
 
IV. Top-down influences from outside the visual system 
 
In recent years, several studies provided evidence to suggest that processing 
levels that most would consider to be outside the visual system can exert top-
down influences on early vision. Here, we will discuss examples of how 
expectation and memory representations influence processing at early visual 
stages and we will argue that the function of such top-down effects can be 
readily understood in terms of the well-established processes discussed in the 
previous section. 
 
Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists often mean very different things 
when they talk about expectations. At first glance, the concept of expectations 
seems to be closely related to that of attention (in the sense that changes in 
expectations often lead to changes in attention and vice versa). Closer analysis, 
however, reveals that both concepts can and should be kept apart. We will follow 
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the neuroscientific parlance in what follows and assume that expectation reflects 
prior information about the probabilistic nature of our environment, whereas 
attention reflects current motivational relevance (for a review see Summerfield 
& de Lange, 2014; Summerfield & Egner, 2009). Of course, expectation and 
attention often coincide in natural viewing situations. Nevertheless, carefully 
controlled experiments can dissociate their respective contribution to visual 
processing by independently manipulating probability of stimulus occurrence 
and task-relevance. For instance, using fMRI and multivariate pattern analysis, it 
has been demonstrated that the expectation of an upcoming stimulus decreases 
the overall activity in early visual cortex (V1) but increases its information 
content (Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012). This pattern of results suggests that 
expectation of an upcoming stimulus leads to a restructuring of earlier 
processing mechanisms that sharpens and optimises their response properties 
in line with the expected stimulus. Importantly, this effect can be dissociated 
from the task-relevance of the expected features, thereby supporting the notion 
that the finding is separate from attentional modulation.3 A range of other 
studies that employ computational modelling, psychophysical techniques, or 
neuroimaging come to a similar conclusion (e.g. (Kok, Failing, & de Lange, 2014; 
Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008; Wyart, Nobre, & Summerfield, 2012). An 
important question is of course whether predictions of forthcoming sensory 
events are coded within the visual system. While this is a possibility, current evidence suggests that the brainǯs memory and executive systems are more 
likely candidates {Summerfield:2009gb}. 
 
A second set of studies that is of relevance in the current context has focussed on 
the role of memory representations in shaping early visual processing. Moore 
and Cavanagh (1998) addressed this question in a psychophysical study, in 
which they systematically explored two-tone image perception. On first viewing, 
two-tone images appear like meaningless black and white patches. However, 
once the observer has viewed the original template image from which the two-
tone was created and has therefore received prior information about image 
content, the visual system is able to bind patches together into a coherent 
percept. Given that sensory stimulation remains identical before and after the 
perceptual change, two-tone image perception potentially provides an ideal 
index of the role of top-down influences from memory representations on 
perception. Based on detailed experiments that scrutinised the role of various 
factors in the perception of these stimuli, Moore and Cavanagh (1998) concluded 
that two-tone image disambiguation requires a top-down processing approach, 
in which the observerǯs information processing system follows a global-to-local 
direction of analysis: Based on memory of semantic content, individual 
volumetric parts and other details of the objects are recovered.  
 
                                                 
3
 Of course, attention can influence visual processing at all levels. The purpose of this 
discussion is not to demonstrate that expectations can, but attention cannot influence 
early visual processing, but rather to separate out influences from expectations and those 
from attention. The extent to which attention can be considered a top-down influence 
on perception is a whole different discussion that we will not explore in this paper.  
 12 
Neuroimaging studies confirm the conclusions from this behavioural work and 
provide detailed information about the localisation of the measured effects along 
the visual processing stream. Of particular interest is a study that showed how 
the perceptual change from meaningless patches to a coherent percept that can 
be generated with two-tone images is accompanied by changes in the pattern of 
activity even in early visual areas (V1, V2, V3) (Hsieh, Vul, & Kanwisher, 2010). 
In particular, the similarity in the activation patterns found in response to the 
two-tone image and the full template image increases when the two-tone image 
was perceived as a coherent percept in comparison to when it was seen as 
meaningless patches. This result confirms the notion that early information 
processing is reshaped under the instruction of the high-level interpretation of a 
stimulus. The source of this top-down process are memory-related brain areas 
such as precuneus and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g., Dolan et al., 1997; 
Hegdé & Kersten, 2010). 
 
It is noteworthy that these top-down influences are not specific to artificial 
stimuli such as two-tone images but can also be measured using pictures of 
natural scenes, suggesting that top-down influences constitute the typical 
processing mode under natural viewing conditions. In a recent psychophysical 
study, Neri (2014) embedded noisy edge elements into natural scenes either in 
line with the contours of an object or orthogonal to this contour. Using 
sophisticated reverse-correlation analyses, the perceptual filter of low-level 
feature detectors was recovered, that observers used to judge whether the 
embedded edge element was in line with the contour of the object or not. 
Importantly, filters were measured in two different conditions: The same images 
were either shown upright or upside down. The rationale of this manipulation is 
that early visual areas do not care about this manipulation; these images provide 
the same input to neurons in the early parts of the visual system. However, the 
extraction of semantic content is disrupted in images that are presented upside 
down. The study found that the tuning of perceptual filters was influenced by the 
extent to which semantic information could be extracted from the images. This 
suggests that the global, semantic content of a visual scene can reshape the 
properties of local information processing units early in the visual system, a 
conclusion that is supported by a computational model of these effects. It is 
critical to note that that this study explicitly controlled for effects of attention 
and found the facilitatory effect of top-down modulation by semantic content to 
be orthogonal to that of attentional modulation. 
 
The influences of expectation and memory on perception that we have 
mentioned above are presumably closely related. In fact, some proposals view 
both processes as part of the same top-down machinery (Bar, 2009). Regardless 
of whether this is the case, it is noteworthy that the expectation- and memory-
induced changes in the responsiveness of signal-selective units that most likely 
underlies sharpening of representations in early visual areas is reminiscent of 
the effects of top-down processing within the visual system that we discussed in 
the previous section. In other words, similarly to how influences from high- onto 
low-level perceptual processing provide a means of combining global and local 
levels of perceptual analyses, top-down influences of expectation and memory 
onto perception allow an observer to integrate relevant information at an even 
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more global level with sensory inputs. The ultimate aim of top-down influences 
in both instances is the optimisation of information processing at the system 
level. This strategy does not come without cost. Top-down influences from 
expectation and memory representations have been demonstrated to be of 
clinical significance (Schmack et al., 2013; Teufel et al., 2015), where an undue 
reliance on this type of processing can increase the risk of a loss of contact with 
reality characteristic of psychosis.  
 
 
V. Conclusions 
Humans and nonhuman primates live in a highly complex and ever-changing 
visual world. In order to deal with the resultant uncertainty and to generate 
adaptive representations that can guide successful behaviour, visual information 
processing is highly interactive with an important role for top-down influences 
from higher-level representations onto lower-level perceptual processing. While 
some of these higher-level representations can safely be considered to be 
perceptual – and the resultant top-down influence can be considered to be 
located within the visual system – we argue, that current evidence suggests the 
existence of top-down influences that some would consider to cross the 
perception/cognition divide. Independent of the source, the purpose of all of 
these instances of top-down processing seems to be an adjustment of low-level, 
local circuitry to current visual inputs. This optimisation leads to sparse 
representations that enable both fine-scale resolution of sensory input and large-
scale integration through higher-level representations.4 
 
 
                                                 
4
 It is an important question how top-down influences on perceptual processing (of the kind we focused 
on) relate to philosophical questions about how ‘cognitive penetrability’ poses a problem for some 
accounts of perceptual justification (see Siegel 2011). While we cannot address the complex issue here 
for lack of space, see Nanay forthcoming for a possible account of the epistemic consequences of top-
down influences of the kind analysed in this paper.  
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